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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE 
RELATED TO OIL AND GAS LEASING AND CONVEYANCING 
 
Ross H. Pifer1 
 
Pennsylvania is the largest producer of shale gas in the United 
States and is the second-largest natural gas-producing state overall.2  
Owing to its strategic location atop the Marcellus and Utica Shale 
Formations, Pennsylvania’s position as a major natural gas producer 




 1. Associate Dean for Clinics and Experiential Learning, Director of the Center 
for Agricultural and Shale Law, Penn State Law.  The copyright for this article has 
been retained by author, all rights reserved. 
 2. See Shale Gas Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm [https://perma.cc/G3F4-
HEEY] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019) (indicating that Pennsylvania had produced 
5,365 Bcf of natural gas in 2017); See also Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and 
Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_VGM_mmcf_a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JW26-ZZ28] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019) (indicating that Texas 
had produced 7,847,102 MMcf while Pennsylvania had produced 6,210,673 MMcf 
of natural gas in 2018). 
  
2020] PENNSYLVANIA 335 
 
sixteenth among states in total natural gas production.3  With this rapid 
rise in the amount of natural gas development, there has been a 
corresponding increase in activity in courtrooms across 
Pennsylvania—both in state and federal courts.  As a result, 
Pennsylvania oil and gas law has evolved within a number of different 
legal areas, with leasing and title issues perhaps being among the most 
frequent—and most important—topics that have been addressed by 
courts.  This survey will address the 2019 reported judicial opinions 
issued by state courts in Pennsylvania that address oil and gas leasing 
and title issues. 
 
I. PAYMENT IN LIEU OF FREE GAS 
 
During Pennsylvania’s long history of conventional oil and gas 
development, landowners have often sought lease provisions that 
provided them with free natural gas for use in home heating —a 
valuable benefit during cold Pennsylvania winters—when wells were 
drilled on their properties.  In these free gas lease provisions, a 
landowner typically receives up to a specified quantity of natural gas 
at no cost and in some instances, leases permit the operator to provide 
payment of a market value price in lieu of providing free gas.  In Mitch 
v. XTO Energy,4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided an 
interpretation of a payment in lieu of free gas clause in an oil and gas 
lease.  Raymond Mitch owned a 53.28-acre tract of real estate in Butler 
County, and in 2012, he executed an oil and gas lease with XTO 
Energy.5  This lease provided for the payment of a bonus, 18% 
royalties, and an additional payment equal to the market value of 
300,000 cubic feet of natural gas if certain conditions were satisfied.6  
The specific conditions that needed to be satisfied in order to trigger 
the additional payment to the surface estate owner were that a well 
was “drilled on the lease premises;” that the well was “producing in 
 
 3. See Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving Forward 
After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 619, n.28 
(2011) (noting the top sixteen natural gas-producing states in 2005 according to data 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
 4. Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). 
 5. Id. at 1137. 
 6. Id.  
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paying quantities;” and that “the surface owner ha[d] his primary 
residence on the lease premises.”7   
XTO Energy did not construct a well on the Mitch property.  
Mitch’s acreage, however, was pooled together with other leases, and 
a well was constructed within the pooled acreage on a neighboring 
property.8  The well that was drilled on the neighboring property was 
a horizontal well that traversed through the subsurface estate of 
Mitch’s property, but there was no activity at all on Mitch’s surface 
estate.9  Following the drilling of this well, Mitch filed suit seeking a 
declaration that he was entitled to a payment in lieu of free gas 
pursuant to the terms of his lease.10  The Butler County Court of 
Common Pleas rejected his claim, granting a summary judgment in 
favor of XTO Energy.11   
In Mitch’s appeal of this decision, the Superior Court 
determined that a de novo review was appropriate because the issue 
was one of contract interpretation.12  The parties agreed that the 
relevant well met the producing in paying quantities standard, and 
Mitch’s primary residence was located on the lease premises.  Thus, 
the issue for the court to resolve was limited to an interpretation of the 
meaning of the phrase “drilled on the lease premises.”13  Mitch argued 
that the horizontal well drilled through his subsurface estate was 
within the lease premises.14  XTO Energy countered that the lease 
required the well to be drilled on the surface estate for the lessor to be 
entitled to receive the payment in lieu of free gas.15  The Superior 
Court accepted the argument of XTO Energy and concluded that the 
parties intended for the language “drilled on the lease premises” to 
mean drilled on the surface estate of Mitch’s property.  According to 
the court, “[i]t is unreasonable to find that the parties intended to 
compensate a surface owner” (emphasis in original) for a well located 
on the surface estate of another property.16   
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1138. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1139. 
 14. Id. at 1140. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1141. 
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II. SCOPE OF SURFACE ESTATE ACCESS 
 
In Porter v. Chevron Appalachia,17 the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court addressed another issue relating to the surface estate, this time 
reviewing the scope of the grant conveyed in an oil and gas lease.  
There, the Superior Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary 
injunction confirming the right of a drilling company to utilize the 
surface estate for pre-drilling activities.  In 2002, the Porters granted 
an oil and gas lease on their seventy-six-acre tract to Atlas America, 
Inc. (“Atlas”).18  Following the execution of the lease, Atlas drilled 
conventional vertical wells on the property.19  By virtue of its 
acquisition of Atlas assets, Chevron assumed control over the lease in 
question, and in 2017, Chevron notified the Porters of its intention to 
construct a well pad on the property that would be utilized for the 
extraction of oil and gas, including from neighboring properties.20  
After the Porters filed litigation objecting to this use of their property, 
Chevron continued its pre-drilling activities, and its personnel arrived 
on the property to mark the proposed drilling location.21  While this 
activity was underway, Mr. Porter informed the Chevron personnel 
that they should “get off [the] property while the getting’s good.”  
Chevron personnel interpreted this as a threat and vacated the 
property.22  Chevron then filed a motion for an injunction to prohibit 
the Porters from restricting their pre-drilling operations on the 
property.23  On November 29, 2017, the Fayette County Court of 
Common Pleas granted the requested injunction, and an appeal 
ensued.24   
The Superior Court reviewed the prerequisites for the grant of 
a preliminary injunction.25  The court opined that reasonable grounds 
existed to support the conclusion that Chevron would suffer 
 
 17. 204 A.3d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). 
 18. Id. at 414. 
 19. Id. at 415. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 416. 
 25. Id. 
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irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.26  Specifically, the 
Superior Court noted the lower court’s findings that the failure to grant 
the requested injunction would impact other drilling plans and that 
added delay was particularly troublesome because some activities 
could not be performed in the winter months.27  The Superior Court 
also agreed that the testimony supported a finding that it was 
“impossible to quantify” Chevron’s damages caused by delay.28  With 
regard to the issue of who was altering the status quo among the 
parties, the Superior Court concluded that it was the Porters who were 
altering the status quo by preventing Chevron’s “contractual right of 
access.”29  Thus, the injunction restored the parties to the status quo 
position according to the court.30  As such, the Superior Court affirmed 
the lower court ruling, noting that the injunction was limited to pre-
drilling activities undertaken to prepare a permit application with the 
Department of Environmental Protection.31 
 
III. CONVEYANCE OF MINERAL ESTATE THROUGH DEED IN LIEU OF 
CONDEMNATION 
 
Horizontal drilling, together with hydraulic fracturing, is an 
essential technology for the extraction of shale gas.32  The widespread 
use of horizontal drilling has expanded the types of real estate that 
have value for purposes of natural gas extraction.  For example, there 
now is interest for natural gas development in the subsurface estate 
beneath roadways.  In O’Layer McCready v. Department of 
Community and Economic Development,33 the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court addressed the ownership of oil and gas rights 
beneath a public roadway.  Sarah O’Layer McCready acquired title to 
a parcel of land in Lawrence County in 1978.34  In 1990, she conveyed 
her interest in a portion of that parcel to the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
 26. Id. at 417. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 419. 
 32. See Ross H. Pifer, A Greener Shade of Blue?: Technology and the Shale 
Revolution, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 131, 135 (2013) (discussing 
the development of technology that enabled the extraction of shale gas). 
 33. 204 A.3d 1009 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). 
 34. Id. at 1011. 
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Commission (“Commission”) through a deed in lieu of 
condemnation.35  The Commission sought to acquire this land for the 
construction of the Beaver Valley Expressway.36  Pursuant to the 
language in the deed, the conveyance included “all the estate, right, 
title, interests, property, claim, and demand whatsoever of 
[McCready].”37   
In 2012, McCready filed a quiet title action seeking ownership 
of the mineral estate to the parcel.38  In support of her claim, she 
alleged that she had conveyed her property interest solely to avoid the 
condemnation action and that it was not necessary for the Commission 
to own the mineral estate for them to construct the highway.39  
Furthermore, she alleged that she did not intend to transfer any interest 
in excess of that which would have been conveyed through the 
eminent domain process.40  Finally, she claimed that the compensation 
that she received from the Commission for the property interest 
conveyed did not account for the value of the mineral estate.41  The 
Commission’s claim for ownership of the mineral estate was based on 
its argument that the language of the deed was clear in expressing the 
intention of the parties that the mineral estate had been conveyed.42   
The court rejected McCready’s arguments, finding there were 
no allegations to support her claims.  First, the court found that the 
deed was clear and there had been no allegation of mutual mistake to 
justify the introduction of parol evidence.43  The court also concluded 
that the Commission did have the authority to obtain a fee simple 
estate and that the reasonableness of acquiring a fee simple estate was 
supported by testimony that maintaining control over the subsurface 
estate benefited the safe operation of the roadway.44  Finally, the court 
found no evidence that the purchase price for the property was 
inadequate.45  Thus, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the deed had 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1012. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 1013. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1017. 
 44. Id. at 1018. 
 45. Id. at 1019. 
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conveyed a fee simple interest in the property and that the Commission 
was the owner of the mineral estate.46   
 
IV. USE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS IN OIL AND GAS LEASING 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
During the leasing boom at the onset of shale development in 
Pennsylvania, many landowners raised complaints about company 
actions in the procurement of leases.47  Based upon these complaints, 
the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) sought to 
utilize Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law (“UTPCPL”)48 against oil and gas companies.49  OAG 
filed suit against Anadarko Petroleum Company (“Anadarko”), 
Chesapeake Energy Corporation (“Chesapeake”), and related 
companies under the authority of UTPCPL, alleging “deceptive, 
misleading, and unfair tactics” as well as antitrust violations in the oil 
and gas leasing process.50  OAG alleged that Anadarko and 
Chesapeake had apportioned the territories in which they each would 
seek oil and gas leases in an effort to reduce competition.51  Anadarko 
and Chesapeake countered these allegations by arguing that UTPCPL 
only applies to sellers in consumer transactions and that, in the oil and 
gas leasing context, they were buyers.52   
The Commonwealth Court began its analysis by reviewing the 
purpose of UTPCPL as a remedial statute that attempts to equalize the 
bargaining power between sellers and consumers.53  Rejecting the 
argument asserted by Anadarko and Chesapeake, the court found that 
the alleged conduct came within the definitions of “trade” and 
“commerce” under UTPCPL.54  Additionally, the court concluded that 
 
 46. Id. at 1019. 
 47. See Ross H. Pifer, Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case 
Law upon he Sesquicentennial of the United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. 
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 47, 53 (2010-2011) (discussing cases alleging that 
companies had fraudulently induced landowners into signing oil and gas leases). 
 48. 73 PA. STAT. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.3 (West 2019). 
 49. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 
2019). 
 50. Id. at 53. 
 51. Id. at 53–54. 
 52. Id. at 54. 
 53. See id. at 55 (quoting Com., by Creamer v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 
A.2d 812, 815-17 (Pa. 1974)). 
 54. Id. at 56. 
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based upon Pennsylvania precedent, “leases were, in essence, sales.”55  
Although Pennsylvania precedent focused on residential leases, the 
court concluded that business and commercial leases also fell within 
the ambit of the law.56  As a result, OAG had the authority to utilize 
UTPCPL to pursue enforcement against Anadarko and Chesapeake for 
claims that they acted in a deceptive, misleading, and unfair manner 
towards landowners in the oil and gas leasing context.57   
With regard to OAG’s use of UTPCPL to pursue antitrust 
violations, the Commonwealth Court rendered a split verdict.  The 
court held that the statutory language of UTPCPL does not authorize 
OAG to pursue violations for unlawful joint ventures or for market 
sharing activities between companies.58  On the other hand, the court 
did find that OAG had authority to pursue antitrust violations where 
companies engage in “unfair methods of competition” or “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”59  
 
V. ABANDONMENT OF LEASE 
 
In SLT Holdings, LLC, v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc.,60 the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court invoked the theory of abandonment to 
rule that an oil and gas lease was no longer valid and that the lessee’s 
removal of oil from tanks on the leased premises constituted 
conversion.  SLT Holdings owned oil and gas rights on two parcels 
where the leases were held by Mitch-Well Energy.61  The leases 
contained fairly typical habendum clauses that included a five-year 
primary term and a secondary term lasting “as long thereafter as oil or 
gas or other substances covered hereby are or can be produced in 
paying quantities.”62  Under the terms of the leases, the lessee had an 
affirmative obligation to drill a minimum number of wells in 
accordance with a prescribed drilling schedule.63  The lease provided 
that if the lessee failed to comply with this drilling schedule, the lease 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 57. 
 57. Id. at 59. 
 58. Id. at 60–61.   
 59. Id. at 61. 
 60. __ A.3d __, 2019 WL 3980188 (Pa. Super. 2019). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. at *4. 
 63. Id. at *5. 
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would terminate.  In the event of termination, however, the lessee 
would retain acreage totaling twenty acres around each well.64  By 
lease amendment, the amount of the retained acreage per well was 
later reduced to five acres.65   
The lessee did drill wells on the property, but not in 
compliance with the prescribed drilling schedule.66  Additionally, 
from 1996 through 2013, there was no marketable production from the 
wells on the property.67  Mitch-Well Energy made no royalty 
payments nor any other payments to SLT Holdings during this time.68  
Mitch-Well Energy, however, did periodically attend to the wells to 
ensure that they were in regulatory compliance.69  In 2013, Mitch-Well 
Energy entered the property to empty the storage tanks and then sold 
the oil recovered, which yielded proceeds in the amount of 
$9,069.53.70  At this time, SLT Holdings filed suit, seeking a 
declaration that Mitch-Well Energy had no legal right to be on the 
premises and that its actions in collecting oil from the storage tanks 
constituted conversion.71  Even though there had been no marketable 
production for a sixteen-year period, the Superior Court relied on the 
theory of abandonment to rule in favor of SLT Holdings.  The court 
cited Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp.72 for the “proposition that an 
oil and gas lease may be abandoned.”73  Based upon the extended 
period of inactivity at the wells, the court found that Mitch-Well 
Energy’s actions satisfied the requirements to constitute 
abandonment.74  As a result of this abandonment, Mitch-Well Energy 
had relinquished its legal right to control over the acreage surrounding 





 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *2. 
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at *8. 
 71. Id. at *2. 
 72. Id. at *8 (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 759, 783-
96 (W.D. Pa. 2004)). 
 73. Id. at *7. 
 74. Id. at *7. 
 75. Id. at *8. 
